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Facial Adjudication of Disciplinary
Provisions in Union Constitutions
The "Bill of Rights of Members of Labor Organizations,"' Title I of
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Lan-
drum-Griffin Act or LMRDA),2 extends freedoms of speech and assembly
to the relationship of a union member and his union3 and declares that
provisions of union constitutions inconsistent with those rights shall be "of
no force or effect."'4 In the two decades since the passage of the Landrum-
Griffin Act, union members have brought numerous lawsuits seeking to
enforce the rights guaranteed to them by the LMRDA and to challenge
disciplinary actions taken against them by their unions. Although the
union members have won many of these suits, the courts usually have left
intact the constitutional provisions upon which the illegal discipline had
been based.
This Note contends that disciplinary provisions in the constitutions of
many of this country's unions pose serious threats to the exercise of rights
guaranteed by the LMRDA and that the usual approach taken by the
federal courts in LMRDA litigation fails to promote the union democracy
and autonomy that the legislation sought to further. The Note maintains
that the only way for courts adequately to safeguard the interests of un-
ions and their members is to accept the mandate of the LMRDA and void
1. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, §§ 101-105, 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-415
(1976).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The LMRDA is composed of six sections.
Title I, 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-415 (1976), is the "Bill of Rights" for union members. Title II, 29 U.S.c.
§§ 431-441 (1976), imposes reporting requirements on labor organizations, their officers and employ-
ees, and on employers. Title III, 29 U.S.C. §§ 461-466 (1976 & Supp. 1111979), regulates the power
of labor organizations to impose trusteeships on subordinate organizations. Title IV, 29 U.S.C. §§
481-483 (1976), prescribes guidelines for union elections and provides for enforcement, if needed, by
the Secretary of Labor. Title V, 29 U.S.C. §§ 501-504 (1976), imposes fiduciary responsibilities on
officers of labor organizations. Title VI, 29 U.S.C. §§ 521-531 (1976), contains miscellaneous provi-
sions. For a section-by-section analysis of the LMRDA, see Aaron, The Labor-Management Report-
ing and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HARV. L. REV. 851 (1960).
3. Every member of any labor organization shall have the right to meet and assemble freely
with other members; and to express any views, arguments, or opinions; and to express at
meetings of the labor organization his views, upon candidates in an election of the labor organ-
ization or upon any business properly before the meeting, subject to the organization's estab-
lished and reasonable rules pertaining to the conduct of meetings: Provided, That nothing
herein shall be construed to impair the right of a labor organization to adopt and enforce
reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every member toward the organization as an institu-
tion and to his refraining from conduct that would interfere with its performance of its legal or
contractual obligations.
LMRDA, § 101(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (1976).
4. LMRDA, § 101(b), 29 U.S.C. § 411(b) (1976) ("Any provision of the constitution and bylaws
of any labor organization which is inconsistent with the provisions of this section shall be of no force
or effect.")
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offending provisions on their face, applying when appropriate familiar
constitutional law doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth 5
I. The LMRDA and Union Constitutions
Confronted with evidence of abuses in the labor-relations field, Con-
gress enacted the LMRDA in 1959 both to protect the individual rights of
union members against infringement by union leadership and to enhance
union democracy. The legislators envisioned that union members' active
participation in and criticism of union practices would encourage unions
to regulate their internal affairs and to govern themselves democratically,
without federal intervention.
A. Sections 101(a)(2) and 101(b) of the LMRDA
The LMRDA's "Bill of Rights of Members of Labor Organizations"
contains provisions protecting union members' equal rights, freedom of
speech and assembly, control over dues, initiation fees and assessments,
right to sue, and procedural rights in disciplinary actions.6 The second of
these provisions is 101(a)(2),7 which applies protections modeled after
those of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution8 to the
relationship between a union and its members.9 Under section 101(a)(2),
5. This Note focuses on the speech and assembly protections in the "Bill of Rights." Title I of the
LMRDA also grants other rights to union members. The authorization to void inconsistent constitu-
tional provisions also applies to the enforcement of those rights, and federal courts have on occasion
voided such provisions. See, e.g., DeCampli v. Greeley, 293 F. Supp. 746, 752 (D.N.J. 1968) (holding
provision permitting summary discharge of officers by president "repugnant" to § 101(b) in suit
brought under §§ 101(a)(1), (2), and (5) of LMRDA); Ryan v. IBEW, 241 F. Supp. 489 (N.D. Ill.
1965), afl'd, 361 F.2d 942 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 935 (1966) (holding provision decreeing
automatic expulsion of member for suing in court before exhausting internal remedies void under §§
101(a)(4) and (b)). The arguments advanced in this Note to encourage a strategy of facial adjudica-
tion may apply with equal force to provisions implicating other § 101(a) rights.
6. LMRDA, §§ 101(a)(1)-(5), 29 U.S.C. §§ 411(a)(1)-(5) (1976).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (1976); see note 3 supra (quoting provision). Section 101(a)(2) rights are
enforceable through § 102, 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1976), a jurisdictional provision granting to members the
right to sue in federal court for relief, including injunctions, to preserve § 101(a) rights.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom of speech...
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble . . .")
9. See 105 CONG. REC. 6472 (1959) (remarks of Sen. McClellan) (bill "would bring to the con-
duct of union affairs and to union members the reality of some of the freedoms from oppression that
we enjoy as citizens by virtue of the Constitution"); id. at 6478 ("Let us define those rights. . . , just
as the rights of the American people are set forth in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution .... ");
Hickey, The Bill of Rights of Union Members, 48 GEO. L.J. 226, 226, 230-32 (1959) (LMRDA bill
of rights intended to emulate that in Constitution); Summers, American Legislation for Union De-
mocracy, 25 MOD. L. REV. 273, 283-84 (1962) (same). The Constitution itself provides free-speech
and assembly protections only against governmental action. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507,
513 (1976) (discussing state-action requirement in labor-law context). Section 101(a)(2) represents an
extension of protections analogous to those of the First Amendment into a nongovernmental context,
accomplished under Congress' power to regulate commerce. Cf. Johnson v. Local 58, IBEW, 181 F.
Supp. 734, 736 (E.D. Mich. 1960) (holding § 101(a)(2) constitutional). But c. note 50 infra (discuss-
ing relationship between unions and federal government).
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a union member may express "any views, arguments, or opinions," unless
such speech falls within a proviso permitting a union to discipline a mem-
ber for behavior interfering either with the member's responsibility to-
ward his union as an institution or with the union's performance of its
legal or contractual obligations.'
Federal courts consistently have construed section 101(a)(2) as granting
to union members very broad rights, in some cases even broader than
those guaranteed by the First Amendment." For example, although a
court may hold a defendant liable for willful and malicious slander, libel,
or misrepresentation,' 2 a union tribunal may not discipline a union mem-
ber for similar speech.' 3
Section 101(b) provides that clauses in union constitutions inconsistent
with the rights granted by section 101(a) "shall be of no force or effect." ' t4
Courts and commentators generally interpret this provision as authorizing
courts, in the course of proceedings challenging disciplinary actions for
violating section 101(a),' 5 to declare offending provisions void on their
face, or even permanently to enjoin their enforcement.' 6 Nevertheless, such
10. See note 3 supra (quoting § 101(a)(2), including proviso).
11. See, e.g., Morrissey v. National Maritime Union, 397 F. Supp. 659, 666 (S.D.N.Y. 1975),
modified, 544 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1976) (Congress intended that union members "should be assured of a
right to speak which goes beyond even that which is Constitutionally protected"); Reyes v. Laborers'
Int'l Union, Local 16, 327 F. Supp. 978, 979-80 (D.N.M. 1971), afl'd, 464 F.2d 595 (10th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 915 (1973) (scope of free speech under LMRDA "broader than that
guaranteed by the Constitution").
12. See Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974) (portrayal in false light
through knowing or reckless untruth not protected by First Amendment); Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (defamation of private plaintiff not privileged speech if fault established);
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (defamation of public official not protected if
done with "actual malice").
13. See, e.g., Nix v. Fulton Lodge No. 2, IAMAW, 262 F. Supp. 1000, 1005 (N.D. Ga. 1967),
aff'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 415 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1969) (truth or falsity of
member's statement immaterial, even if it amounts to "malicious vilification," libel, or slander); Stark
v. Twin City Carpenters Dist. Council, 219 F. Supp. 528, 533 (D. Minn. 1963) (union may not
discipline member for "wilful slander" when statement does not fall within § 101(a)(2) proviso); note
25 infra (discussing policy reasons for prohibiting disciplining of slander, libel, and
misrepresentation).
14. LMRDA, § 101(b), 29 U.S.C. § 411(b) (1976). See note 4 supra (quoting provision).
15. There does not appear to be any support for allowing courts to void provisions whether or not
an actual disciplinary action has taken place. Section 102 of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1976),
the jurisdictional provision enforcing § 101(a) rights, applies only to persons whose § 101(a) rights
have been "infringed" in some way. Cf. Keene v. Ice Mach. Independent Employees' Ass'n, 331 F.
Supp. 1355, 1360 (M.D. Pa. 1971) (plaintiffs bear burden of proving actual violation of own rights as
union members).
16. See Semancik v. UMW Dist. 5, 466 F.2d 144, 155 (3d Cir. 1972) (rejecting argument that
court may grant injunctions only on plaintiff-by-plaintiff basis and holding that § 101(b) empowers
court to void constitutional provision); c. Recent Developments-Labor Law-Union Member Free
Speech, 61 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1595 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Recent Developments] (legislative his-
tory of LMRDA supports courts' assumption that § 101(b) applies to provisions conflicting with
§ 101(a) rights).
Courts adopting a strategy of facial adjudication of constitutional provisions have used different
procedural remedies and devices. Compare Semancik v. UMW Dist. 5, 466 F.2d 144 (3d Cir. 1972)
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facial review of provisions in union constitutions usually does not occur.1 7
Although the federal courts occasionally have voided provisions inconsis-
tent with section 101(a)(2) rights, 8 they more frequently have limited
themselves merely to nullifying particular illegal disciplinary actions taken
under those provisions."9 Many of the provisions left in place by the courts
prohibit expression protected by section 101(a)(2), either directly or
through their broad and ill-defined contours.20 In most of these cases, the
courts did not explain their failure or refusal to void the provisions; 2 in
(granting permanent injunction against further prosecution under challenged provision) and Nix v.
Fulton Lodge No. 2, IAMAW, 71 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 113,859 (N.D. Ga. 1972), af'd sub nom. Nix
v. Grand Lodge, IAMAW, 479 F.2d 382 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1024 (1973) (declaring
challenged provision invalid and permanently enjoining imposition of disciplinary sanctions) with
Salhhandler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 946 (1963) (declaring chal-
lenged provisions "unenforceable") and Turner v. Air Transp. Lodge 1894, 83 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 1
10,530 (E.D.N.Y.), aft'd, 590 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 919 (1979) (challenged
provision "declared void"). Injunctive relief presumably has greater impact than does declaratory re-
lief on future union conduct and litigation. Moreover, a prayer for an injunction enables a plaintiff to
seek relief against defendants such as parent international unions. See Fulton Lodge No. 2, IAMAW
v. Nix, 415 F.2d 212, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 946 (1972). Thus, Semancik and
Nix represent more effective forms of facial adjudication than do Salzhandler and Turner. Moreover,
the meager legislative discussion of § 101(b) suggests that Congress intended reviewing courts to do
more than simply disregard provisions inconsistent with § 101(a). In his written analysis of § 101(b),
105 CONG. REC. 7023 (1959), Senator Kennedy noted that the section "[v]oids any provision of a
union constitution or by-laws or other governing charter which is inconsistent with [§ 101(a)]."
This Note shall use the term "void" as synonymous with "render unenforceable" or "enjoin the
application of."
17. See C. SUMMERS & R. RABIN, THE RIGHTS OF UNION MEMBERS 37 (1979) (courts generally
allow wide latitude with respect to union constitutional provisions).
18. See, e.g., Semancik v. UMW Dist. 5, 466 F.2d 144, 149 n.3, 156-57 (3d Cir. 1972) (perma-
nently enjoining use of "vague" and "ill-defined" provision forbidding "resorting to dishonest or ques-
tionable [election] practices"); Salzhandler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
946 (1963) (holding unenforceable provisions making criticism, whether libelous or not, subject to
discipline); Turner v. Air Transp. Lodge 1894, 83 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 110,530 (E.D.N.Y.), afl'd, 590
F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 919 (1979) (voiding "vague and overbroad" provision
prohibiting support for certain ideologies).
19. See, e.g., Giordani v. Upholsterers Int'l Union, 403 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding member
improperly disciplined for accusing union of misappropriating funds, but not voiding provision
prohibiting "incorrect, false, malicious, or slanderous statements"); Burns v. Local 1503, Int'l Bhd. of
Painters, 77 Lab. Cas. (CCH) % 11,075 (D. Conn. 1975) (holding member improperly disciplined for
charging shop steward with malfeasance, but not voiding provisions against libel, false charges, and
causing dissension).
These cases did announce substantive principles that could guide future union behavior. Such hold-
ings, however, do not have the same effect as decisions voiding the provisions at issue. First, the
pronouncements are not legally binding upon the union, at least with respect to the union's internal
disciplinary hearings, which proceed in accordance with the union's constitution and outside the scope
of judicial surveillance. Second, the union can always claim in subsequent actions involving the same
provisions that the members were disciplined for conduct distinguishable from that in the previous
case.
20. See note 19 supra (citing cases); Maxwell v. UAW, Local 1306, 489 F. Supp. 745 (C.D. Ill.
1980) (conduct unbecoming a union member); Gartner v. Soloner, 220 F. Supp. 115 (E.D. Pa. 1963),
rev'd in part, affd in part and remanded with directions, 384 F.2d 348 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 1040 (1968) (displaying signs containing "disparaging remarks" about officers or Local).
21. Courts typically do not mention § 101(b) unless they intend to use it. But cf. Archibald v.
Local 57, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 276 F. Supp. 326, 332 (D.R.I. 1967) (refusing to void
provision and stating that "lilt is this court's opinion that it need go no further than to have the
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several others, courts conditioned consideration of section 101(b) remedies
upon a showing of a pattern of abuse in the application of the disputed
provisions."
B. The Disciplinary Provisions
Because of the courts' failure to exercise vigorously their voiding and
enjoining powers pursuant to section 101(b), union constitutions often
contain provisions similar to ones found to lend themselves to abusive ap-
plications.23  For example, some constitutions still include provisions
prohibiting "abuse, libel or slander, 24 although a long line of cases has
held that a union member's speech, even if defamatory, is protected by
section 101(a)(2). 21
Some union constitutions also permit union disciplinary bodies to pun-
ish members for creating "dissension" or destroying "peace and harmony"
[provision] interpreted only to the extent of this decision"). Nor do plaintiffs always request relief
under § 101(b); rather, they sometimes seek only nullification of union disciplinary sanctions. Inter-
view with Amy Gladstein, labor attorney, by telephone to New York City (Feb. 12, 1981) (notes on
file with Yale Law Journal).
22. See, e.g., Kuebler v. Cleveland Lithographers and Photoengravers Union Local 24-P, 473
F.2d 359, 364 (6th Cir. 1973) ("consistent policy of illegal application" not found); Ritz v.
O'Donnell, 413 F. Supp. 1365, 1377 (D.D.C. 1976), aft'd, 566 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (no "con-
stant disciplinary action"). The pattern-of-abuse standard does not seem to require the persistent use
of a provision over an extended period of time. The Kuebler court based its analysis on Semancik v.
UMW Dist. 5, 466 F.2d 144 (3d Cir. 1972), in which the "pattern" consisted not of a general history
of abuse but of two prior applications, both related to the circumstances of the case.
23. See Ross & Taft, The Effect of the LMRDA upon Union Constitutions, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV.
305 (1968) (little amendment of constitutions in light of LMRDA); Summers, Disciplinary Powers of
Unions, 3 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 483, 505-12 (1950) (study of pre-LMRDA cases and constitu-
tions reveals vast number of provisions subject to abuse).
24. Copies of union constitutions cited in this Note that are not otherwise available in the public
record are on file with the Yale Law Journal. To protect unions from unfair individual attack, the
constitutions are identified by code letter rather than by name. The cited provision is found in consti-
tutions B, G, H, and I. Two courts have invalidated similar constitutional provisions. See Salzhandler
v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 946 (1963) (rendering unenforceable provi-
sion prohibiting "libeling, slandering . . . fellow members [or] officers of local unions"); Nix v.
Fulton Lodge No. 2, IAMAW, 71 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 1 13,859 (N.D. Ga. 1972), affd sub nom. Nix
v. Grand Lodge, IAMAW, 479 F.2d 382 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1024 (1973) (permanently
enjoining use of provision prohibiting "[c]irculating or causing in any manner any false statement
reflecting upon the private or public conduct, or falsely or maliciously attacking the character, im-
pugning the motives, or questing [sic] the integrity of any member or officer"). One union recently
deleted a similar provision from its constitution as part of a consent order. See Boswell v. IBEW, 106
L.R.R.MAN. (BNA) 2713 (D.N.J. 1981) ("[plublishing or circulating . . . false reports or
misrepresentations").
25. See notes 13 & 19 supra. In view of the special importance of criticism in the scheme of the
LMRDA, courts have looked askance upon provisions prohibiting libel, slander, or misrepresentation
for three reasons. First, any criticism by union members can be labeled slander or libel. See Salzhan-
dler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445, 449, 451 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 946 (1963). Second, union
tribunals are "unsuited for drawing the fine line between criticism and defamation . . . ." Id. at 450.
Finally, civil remedies remain available to aggrieved parties. Id. at 451; Johnson v. Rockhold, 293 F.
Supp. 1016 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). But see Deacon v. Operating Eng'rs, Local 12, 59 L.R.R.MAN. (BNA)
2706 (S.D. Cal. 1965) (derogatory statements not protected if they fall within § 101(a)(2) proviso).
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among members or local unions. "' Unions frequently abuse such clauses,"
and courts have annulled disciplinary actions taken under analogous pro-
visions. In one case, members of a dissident group that had published a
newsletter criticizing shop stewards were charged with fostering dissen-
sion.2B Another union used a variant of this provision to discipline an
"outspoken" member who had "ruffled many feathers" while advocating
union action toward a thirty-hour work-week and had accused his oppo-
nent of malfeasance.2 9 In both cases, federal courts held the members' con-
duct protected by section 101(a)(2).
Similar problems have arisen with provisions analogous to those that
prohibit actions or conduct "contrary or detrimental to" the interests of
the union;" "abuse of fellow members or officers by written or oral com-
munications";" and "any action or conduct unbecoming to a union mem-
ber."3 2 Although union disciplinary determinations made under such pro-
visions have not withstood judicial scrutiny, the provisions themselves
usually have remained in the union constitutions.
26. Constitutions B and H. Ct Mallick v. IBEW, No. 77-1092 (W.D. Pa. April 16, 1980), rev'd
on other grounds and remanded, 644 F.2d 228 (3d Cir. 1981) (voiding provision concerning
"[creating or attempting to create dissatisfaction or dissension" for failing to "clearly specify what
conduct will be disciplined"). The IBEW agreed to delete this provision from its constitution pursuant
to the consent order in Boswell v. IBEW, 106 L.R.R.MAN. (BNA) 2713 (D.N.J. 1981).
27. Cf Summers, Union Democracy and Union Discipline, 5 N.Y.U. CONF. LAB. 443, 448-53
(1952) (discussing loosely worded "catchall" provisions used to restrict political activism and crush
dissension, and citing examples of application of such provisions).
28. Sheridan v. Liquor Salesmen's Union, Local 2, 303 F. Supp. 999, 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)
(plaintiffs accused shop stewards of failing to rectify alleged violation of collective bargaining agree-
ment and were charged with injuring fellow members by intending to undermine their employment,
undermining solidarity of members, fostering dissension without just cause, reflecting discredit on
union, and engaging in conduct unbecoming a union member). The court granted summary judgment
for the plaintiffs, holding their expression protected by § 101(a)(2), and enjoined the commencement
of the pending disciplinary proceedings. The court did not adjudicate the validity of the provisions
under which the plaintiffs had been charged.
29. Burns v. Local 1503, Int'l Bhd. of Painters, 77 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 111,075 (D. Conn. 1975)
(enjoining union from preventing plaintiff from voting on union matters, attending and participating
in membership meetings, and exercising § 101(a)(2) rights). The court did not discuss the facial
validity of the disciplinary provisions applied to Burns.
30. Constitutions A, E, F, and H. Cf Turner v. Air Transp. Lodge 1894, 83 Lab. Cas. (CCH)
1 10,530 (E.D.N.Y.), afl'd, 590 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 919 (1979) (holding
provision forbidding "giving support. . . to movements or organizations inimical to the I.A.M. or its
established policies and laws" void for vagueness and overbreadth).
31. Constitution D. See TAN 12-13 supra; Burns v. Local 1503, Int'l Bhd. of Painters, 77 Lab.
Cas. (CCH) 11,075 (D. Conn. 1975) (ordering reinstatement of member expelled on charges of,
among other things, "[Ilibeling, slandering, or in any other manner abusing fellow members").
32. Constitution E. Constitutions H and I contain similar versions of the provision. See Mitchell
v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 196 Cal. App. 2d 796, 16 Cal. Rptr. 813 (1961), petition for
hearing denied, 196 Cal. App. 2d 796, 808, 16 Cal. Rptr. 813, 813 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1962) (holding
members who openly campaigned for right-to-work law in contravention of expressed union policy
illegally expelled for "conduct unbecoming a member").
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II. The Need for Facial Adjudication of Disciplinary Provisions of
Union Constitutions
The drafters of the LMRDA sought to protect union democracy and
the personal freedoms of union members without sacrificing the autonomy
of unions to regulate their internal affairs free from federal intervention.
Congress entrusted to the federal judiciary the task of effectuating these
potentially divergent intentions. The approach taken by most courts in
cases arising under section 101(a)(2), however, has failed to realize the
constellation of policies underlying the LMRDA.
A. The Policies Behind the LMRDA
Four basic policies supported the enactment of the LMRDA. The first
and, perhaps, most important goal was the desire of Congress to promote
union democracy." Though unions often are regarded solely as militant
bargaining vehicles bent on securing greater economic gains for their
members,34 a fundamental aim of the labor movement has always been to
give workers a greater voice in industry and labor .3  Thus, the report of
the Senate's Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or
Management Field (the McClellan Committee),36 whose investigations in
1957 and 1958 uncovered numerous examples of subversion of democratic
processes within unions and despotic powers wielded over union members
33. This Note uses the term "union democracy" to express the idea that a union should be run in
a majoritarian manner, in accordance with the desires of its members. Thus, "union democracy"
conveys a political meaning, in contrast to the more personalized notion of "individual rights" or
"personal freedoms." See pp. 151-52 infra. "Union democracy" is also distinct from "union auton-
omy," the right of the union as an organization to manage its own affairs presumably, but not neces-
sarily, in accordance with the principles of "union democracy." See pp. 152-53 infra.
34. See p. 153 infra (discussing union as militant economic organization).
35. See Cox, The Role of Law in Preserving Union Democracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 609, 609-12
(1959) (only democratic unions can go beyond economic goals and both extend rule of law to indus-
trial establishments and enable workers to participate in governing their industrial lives); Summers,
Union Powers and Workers' Rights, 49 MICH. L. REV. 805, 820 (1951) (rights that worker should
have in union that acts as his economic government are essentially same as rights of citizen in demo-
cratic state). But see pp. 153-54 infra (presenting counterargument to union-government analogy).
Industrial democracy, of course, is conceptually distinct from union democracy. The former envi-
sions union participation in the management of industrial enterprises, whereas the latter contemplates
democracy within the union itself. As Professor Summers points out, however, "[olne of the essential
elements of industrial democracy is that the unions, which speak for the workers, should themselves be
democratic. For, if the voice through which workers speak is not democratic, then there is no democ-
racy in the process." Summers, Union democracy in a one-party structure, UNION DEMOCRACY REV.,
Feb. 1981, at 1, 1.
36. S. REP. NO. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) [hereinafter cited as 1958 INTERIM REPORT].
See J. MCCLELLAN, CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT (1962) (discussing findings of McClellan Com-
mittee investigations). The Committee, focusing its investigations on five major unions, found evidence
of abuse of trusteeship powers by international unions, collusion between management and unions,
misuse of union funds, violence in labor-management disputes, gangster infiltration, and violations of
the National Labor Relations Act and the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947. See 1958 IN.
TERIM REPORT, supra, at 4-7.
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by their leaders,17 prompted Congress and the country to act to restore
union democracy. Joining in the McClellan Committee's call for such leg-
islation31 were the American Civil Liberties Union,39 academics, 0 and em-
ployer organizations. 4' The resulting legislation placed particular empha-
sis on the right of free speech contained in section 101(a)(2) and codified
the belief that only through unfettered criticism and debate could union
members gain and maintain control over their own unions.42
The second goal of the LMRDA was to protect individual union mem-
bers in the exercise of personal freedoms. This aim related closely to the
first, not only because the legislators considered free speech and similar
rights essential to democratic governance, 43 but also because Congress en-
visioned that unions legitimately controlled by their members would be
less likely to abuse members' freedoms than would their more oligarchical
37. Id. See Levitan & Loewenberg, The Politics and Provisions of the Landrum-Griffin Act, in
REGULATING UNION GOVERNMENT 28, 33-37 (M. Estey, P. Taft, & M. Wagner eds. 1964) (need for
LMRDA based on McClellan Committee investigations); Seidman, Emergence of Concern with
Union Government and Administration, in REGULATING UNION GOVERNMENT 1 (M. Estey, P. Taft,
& M. Wagner eds. 1964) (same).
38. 1958 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 36, at 450-53 (recommending legislation to regulate and
control union pension, health and welfare funds, insure union democracy, curb activities of middlemen
in labor-management disputes, and clarify "no-man's land" in labor-management relations).
39. See S. REP. NO. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 70 (1959) (citing ACLU's 1958 appeal for labor-
union bill of rights). Cf. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, DEMOCRACY IN LABOR UNIONS 3-5
(1952) (unions exercising powers granted by federal legislation must maintain same democratic stan-
dards required of government); AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, DEMOCRACY IN TRADE UNIONS
4, 28-29, 69-72, 79 (1943) (proposing legislation requiring protection of democratic rights under con-
stitutions, including right to criticize officers, inform others of opposition, organize opposition groups,
and protest outside union if internal information channels are closed).
40. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 35, at 611 (legislation concerning union democracy and fiduciary
responsibilities will strengthen labor movement by removing corruption, rebuilding confidence of
members and public, and warding off repressive measures); Summers, The Role of Legislation in
Internal Union Affairs, 10 LAB. L.J. 155, 157 (1959) (calling for limited legislation granting "ele-
mental rights" needed to attain democratic union).
41. See Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58 MICH.
L. REV. 819, 820-21 (1960) (legislation sought by National Association of Manufacturers, United
States Chamber of Commerce, and employers' organizations); Rayack, LMRDA and the Prospects
for Union Growth, in SYMPOSIUM ON LABOR RELATIONS LAW 109, 109 (R. Slovenko ed. 1961) (one
purpose of LMRDA was to retard union growth). But cf Ross & Taft, supra note 23, at 305 (anti-
labor interests not responsible for federal intervention).
42. See 105 CONG. REC. 6476 (1959) (remarks of Sen. McClellan) (" 'I believe that if you would
give to the individual members of the unions the tools with which to do it, they would pretty well
clean house themselves.' "); id. at 6478 ("I say we must give the members of the union the tools with
which the unions can be given back to them."); Summers, supra note 9, at 279 (guaranteeing demo-
cratic rights was limited form of intervention, promoting self-correction and self-government). Other
sections of the "Bill of Rights" also attempt to advance democratic ends. See LMRDA, § 101(a)(1),
29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) (1976) (granting union members equal rights to vote in union elections and
participate in deliberations); id. § 101(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(3) (1976) (providing that dues may
not be increased nor assessments levied except upon vote of members). The LMRDA also furthers
union democracy through Title III, §§ 301-306, 29 U.S.C. §§ 461-466 (1976 & Supp. 111 1979)
(limiting power of labor organizations to impose trusteeships on subordinate bodies) and Title IV, §§
401-403, 29 U.S.C. §§ 481-483 (1976) (requiring regular union elections under supervision, if neces-
sary, of Secretary of Labor).
43. See pp. 145-46 supra.
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counterparts.4 Nevertheless, the policies of union democracy and personal
freedom are distinct: not all protected speech contributes to the political
process, 45 and not all majorities respect the rights of minorities.4 ,
Third, the framers of the LMRDA sought to promote union autonomy
and freedom from governmental intervention. Federal labor legislation
generally has avoided paternalistic regulation of union affairs and has at-
tempted to enable unions to govern themselves. 47 This attitude originated
in traditional views of the rights of private voluntary associations, whose
forms of government historically had remained independent of the legal
system's surveillance .4  The special characteristics of the modern trade
union, however, made rigid adherence to this paradigm unacceptable in
several respects. Unions exert a much more powerful and comprehensive
control over their members than do more traditional forms of voluntary
associations.49 Moreover, unions derive much of their power over their
members from federal legislation and thus should be treated differently
from purely private associations.5"
44. See note 42 supra.
45. Cf. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977) (expression about "philosophi-
cal, social, artistic, economic, literary, or ethical matters" entitled to full First Amendment protection);
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 576-79 (1978) (discussing theories of free speech). But
cf Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20 (1971) (First
Amendment should protect only "speech that is explicitly political").
46. See Cloke, Labor Democracy, Free Speech and the Right of Rank and File Insurgency, 4 U.
SAN. FERN. V. L. REV. 1, 1-2, 15 (1975) (free-speech rights of rank and file must include right of
democratic insurgency because presumptions in favor of self-organization and right to oppose leader-
ship require that minorities and their views be protected); Summers, supra note 27, at 447-48
("[D]emocracy is more than majority rule, it is also minority rights.")
47. See NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 484 (1960) (National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) does no more than bring union and management together for collective bar-
gaining); NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 401-02 (1952) (NLRA designed to pro-
mote industrial peace by encouraging making of voluntary agreements governing union-employer
relations).
48. See Summers, supra note 27, at 459. Cf Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for
Profit, 43 HARV. L. REV. 993 (1930) (discussing cases involving unions and other voluntary
associations).
49. See Etelson & Smith, Union Discipline Under the Landrum-Griffin Act, 82 HARV. L. REV.
727, 768-69 (1969) (employee can lose job if expelled from union, and union can inflict financial
harassment, injury to reputation, emotional distress, and costs of defending in union proceeding);
Summers, supra note 27, at 459-60 (unions exercise control, through bargaining process, over work-
ers' hours, wages, seniority, vacation, and retirement). Nor are unions strictly voluntary associations.
See Kovner, The Legal Protection of Civil Liberties Within Unions, 1948 WIS. L. REV. 18, 18 (mem-
bership in union not voluntary when it is condition of employment).
50. See Cox, supra note 41, at 819-20 (government grants unions control over bargaining, negoti-
ating, and grievance processes); Summers, supra note 27, at 459-60 (unions obtain much "compulsory
jurisdiction" over members from federal law). Some commentators claim that a union is a quasi-
governmental organization subject to the dictates of the First Amendment. See Summers, Legal Limi-
tations on Union Discipline, 64 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1074 (1951) (unions are industrial governments
and should have no more power to punish speech than civil governments); cf. Beaird & Player, Free
Speech and the Landrum-Griffin Act, 25 ALA. L. REV. 577, 610 (1973) (discussing interrelationship
between free-speech rights in industrial democracy and society at large). But see Meltzer, The NLRA
and Racial Discrimination: The More Remedies, the Better? 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1974)
(statutory provisions reduce need to risk loss of union autonomy inherent in characterizing unions as
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Nevertheless, the LMRDA was not an attempt to insinuate the federal
government into the unions. Rather, it was a regulatory scheme designed
to equip union members with the tools to "clean house themselves,"'" thus
making federal supervision unnecessary. 2 In fact, the Senate's Subcom-
mittee on Labor specifically refused to dictate policy to unions by rejecting
a bill that would have required union constitutions to contain guarantees
of rights equivalent to those embodied in Title I of the LMRDA.5 3
Fourth, the legislators wished to accommodate the special need of un-
ions to curtail some categories of speech. The nature of the collective-
bargaining process demands that a union be able to present a united front
when negotiating with management.54 To some extent, a union is a mili-
tant organization engaged in economic warfare against an entrenched and
powerful opposition, and there may be occasions when it can brook little
dissent.5" The proviso to section 101(a)(2) 5" and the legislative history of
governmental instrumentalities); Wellington, The Constitution, the Labor Union, and "Governmental
Action", 70 YALE L.J. 345 (1961) (rejecting proposition that union conduct should be regulated by
Constitution). Whether union activities in fact constitute state action for purposes of the First Amend-
ment remains unclear. The argument here, however, does not depend on a conclusion that union
activities do constitute state action. Apart from any state-action claim, Professor Cox has argued that
the federal government, having granted regulatory powers to unions, has an obligation to insure that
those powers are not abused. See Cox, supra note 35, at 610-11.
51. See note 42 supra.
52. See Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F.2d 75, 79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366
U.S. 929 (1961) (dictum) (noting congressionally approved policy, rooted in desire to stimulate unions
to take initiative and establish honest and democratic procedures, of first permitting unions to correct
own wrongs).
53. See Rothman, Legislative History of the "Bill of Rights" for Union Members, 45 MINN. L.
REV. 199, 205-06 (1960) (discussing rejection of S. 1137, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), and subse-
quent evolution of § 101(b)).
54. See Sigal, Freedom of Speech and Union Discipline: The "Right" of Defamation and Disloy-
alty, 17 N.Y.U. CONF. LAB. 367, 369-70 (1964) (oversimplification to stress union's function as politi-
cal institution because union is economic institution whose effectiveness depends on strength and
unity); Summers, sopra note 23, at 488-91 (union's effectiveness depends on its ability to lead strikes
and supply industrial peace, and divided union cannot combat employer). But cf Hall, Freedom of
Speech and Union Discipline: The Implications of Salzhandler, 17 N.Y.U. CONF. LAB. 349, 364-65
(1964) (arguing that union vitality and militancy depend on democracy and rank-and-file freedom).
Other labor legislation also recognizes a union's interest in controlling its members' activities. See
Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, § 8(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1976) (recogniz-
ing union's right to prescribe rules with respect to acquisition or retention of union membership).
55. See Goldberg, A Trade-Union Point of View, in LABOR IN A FREE SOCIETY 102, 106-07 (M.
Harrington & P. Jacobs eds. 1959) (unions are fighting organizations; they are not established, se-
cure, or accepted); Selekman, Unions, Corporations, and Industrial Constitutionalism, in SYMPOSIUM
ON LABOR RELATIONS LAW 85, 89 (R. Slovenko ed. 1961) ("A union is a power organization. Its
positive role is to mobilize economic, political, and moral power backed at times by raw power, to win
objectives for members and leaders.") But see Cox, supra note 41, at 829-30 (although autocratic
union may serve members' material demands, only democratic union can achieve idealistic aspirations
justifying labor organizations); Summers, supra note 27, at 458 (doubting whether use of discipline is
related to reality of danger from political dissension, because reported cases show political discipline
most common in most secure unions and political activism most vigorous in new unions struggling for
survival).
It is also to management's advantage that a union be able to achieve a minimal degree of solidarity:
if a union cannot control its own members, then management cannot rely on adherence to the terms of
agreements reached with the union. See Goldberg, supra, at 110-11; Wyle, Landrum-Griffin: A
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the LMRDA recognize a union's interest in managing its own affairs and
controlling certain kinds of expression.17
The modern trade union represents a complex hybrid: it is a "volun-
tary" association attempting to provide for its members increased eco-
nomic benefits and a voice in the workplace while at the same time fend-
ing off attacks from without and dissension within. Autocracy violates its
principles; anarchy saps its effectiveness. It is the task of the federal judi-
ciary to recognize these potentially competing considerations and to fash-
ion a policy that maximizes the possibilities of their realization.
B. The Promotion of LMRDA Policies by Facial Adjudication
The approach taken by the federal judiciary to cases arising under sec-
tion 101(a)(2) has neither optimally protected the rights of union mem-
bers nor enhanced the union democracy and autonomy that the LMRDA
sought to strengthen. Although these potentially divergent interests might
appear to require a mode of case-by-case analysis, balancing different con-
siderations under different circumstances, they actually converge upon a
strategy of facial adjudication of provisions in union constitutions. In or-
der properly to effectuate the four policies supporting the 1959 legislation,
therefore, federal courts should display a greater willingness to void provi-
sions of. union constitutions under section 101(b) of the LMRDA,8 im-
Wrong Step in a Dangerous Direction, 13 N.Y.U. CONF. LAB. 395, 405 (1960).
56. See pp. 145-46 supra (discussing proviso).
57. Early versions of the LMRDA contained no equivalent of Title I's "Bill of Rights." See S.
1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 105 CONG. REC. 5983-92 (1959) (lacking bill of rights but requiring
"codes of ethical practice"); S. REP. No. 1684, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-5 (1958) (discussing S. 3974,
85th Cong., 2d Sess., 104 CONG. REC. 10,657 (1958), and stressing need to "insure union democracy"
but fearing that "paternalistic regulation" would jeopardize "strong independent labor movement").
Many Senators thought that a "Bill of Rights" was unnecessary, given the existence of other federal
labor legislation and state criminal laws, see 105 CONG. REC. 6481-84 (1959) (remarks of Sen. Ken-
nedy), and that it would endanger the growth and vitality of the labor movement, see S. REP. No.
1684, supra, at 1-5. In a subsequent version of the bill, the Senate adopted a floor amendment giving
union members unqualified free-speech rights, 105 CONG. REC. 6475, 6492-93 (1959) (amend. of Sen.
McClellan), but soon compromised the breadth of these rights by inserting a provision permitting
some regulation of members' speech. Id. at 6693-94 (amend. of Sen. Kuchel). See Rothman, supra
note 53, at 206-07 (discussing differences between Kuchel and McClellan amendments). The House
defeated an amendment to the proposed legislation that would have increased a union's censorship
powers over members' speech. See H.R. 8490, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 105 CONG. REC. 15,023-24
(1959) (amend. of Rep. Shelley). This bill had been endorsed by various unions. Id. at 15,516.
The addition of the proviso acknowledged legitimate interests of unions in disciplining members for
certain behavior; nevertheless, courts have usually construed the "Bill of Rights" as emphasizing indi-
vidual rights of union members. See Salzhandler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 946 (1963) (Congress decided desirability of protecting democratic processes within unions
outweighs any possible weakening of unions that may result from freer expression of members' opin-
ions); Kelsey v. Philadelphia Local 8, Int'l Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 294 F. Supp.
1368, 1372-73 (E.D. Pa. 1968), aff'd, 419 F.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1064
(1970) (Congress struck balance in favor of protecting outspoken dissident members).
58. Cf Recent Developments, supra note 16 passim (discussing Semancik v. UMW Dist. 5, 466
F.2d 144 (3d Cir. 1972), and noting necessity and appropriateness of using § 101(b) to order perma-
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porting to their inquiries the constitutional law analytical techniques59 of
vagueness, 0 overbreadth,61 and chilling effect.6
nent injunctive relief against use of constitutional provisions inconsistent with § 101(a)). Although it
emphasizes the need to apply § 101(b) to provisions of union constitutions, the Recent Developments
note does not suggest the full range of arguments supporting facial adjudication that this Note at-
tempts to present, nor does it outline specific guidelines for courts applying facial adjudication.
59. The vagueness, overbreadth, and chilling-effect doctrines are borrowed from First Amendment
jurisprudence. Although the First Amendment by its terms probably does not apply to the labor-union
context, see note 50 supra, independent policy justifications support the use of those First Amendment
concepts to implement the goals of the LMRDA.
60. The vagueness doctrine rests initially upon theories of due process: "It is a basic principle of
due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined."
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (upholding ordinance prohibiting noisy dem-
onstrations near schools during class hours). This due-process principle has two prongs. First, a law
must give potential transgressors fair notice of what behavior to avoid. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City
of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939). Second,
a law must set out explicit standards to guide enforcers, who otherwise might engage in arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement. See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73 (1974). In the First Amend-
ment area, the vagueness doctrine does not depend exclusively upon absence of fair notice. The need
for statutory specificity also derives from a concern with a law's "chilling effect." See L. TRIBE, supra
note 45, at 719; Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV.
67, 72-75 (1960); note 62 infra (discussing chilling effect).
In deciding whether to void a statute, a reviewing court will look for three indicia of impermissible
vagueness: the expression deterred by the law must be real and substantial, judicial reconstruction
must be unavailable, and the litigant challenging the statute must be "one of the entrapped innocent."
L. TRIBE, supra note 45, at 718-20. See p. 164 infra (discussing substantiality requirement); note 93
infra (discussing reconstruction possibilities); d. p. 165 infra (discussing statutes with and without
"cores").
61. The overbreadth doctrine holds that a statute is void on its face for overbreadth if it "does not
aim specifically at evils within the allowable area of. . . control but . . . sweeps within its ambit
other activities that . . . constitute an exercise" of protected expression. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
U.S. 88, 97 (1940) (holding statute prohibiting all picketing void for overbreadth). If the statutory line
burdens conduct protected by the judicial line, the statute is overbroad and ripe for invalidation. L.
TRIBE, supra note 45, at 710. See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972) (holding statute
prohibiting use of "opprobrious words or abusive language, tending to cause a breach of the peace"
void for overbreadth because not limited to "fighting" words); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S.
500 (1964) (holding statute denying passport privileges to members of subversive organizations void
for overbreadth for failing to consider existence of scienter, member's degree of activity, and traveler's
purpose and destination).
A litigant may challenge a law on overbreadth grounds if protected activity constitutes a significant
part of the law's reach and there exists no way satisfactorily to sever the law's constitutional from its
unconstitutional applications so as to excise the latter in the course of a single adjudication. L. TRIBE,
supra note 45, at 711. See p. 164 infra (discussing substantiality requirement).
Although a vague statute is likely also to be overbroad, an overbroad statute need not be vague.
Bernard, Avoidance of Constitutional Issues in the United States Supreme Court: Liberties of the
First Amendment, 50 MICH. L. REV. 261, 275 (1951). But see Note, First Amendment Vagueness
and Overbreadth: Theoretical Revisions by the Burger Court, 31 VAND. L. REV. 609, 611 (1978)
(latent, implicit vagueness in every overbroad statute because actor cannot know whether conduct will
be protected in court if prosecuted under overbroad law).
62. The chilling-effect argument is based on the fear that persons "sensitive to the perils posed by
. . . indefinite language . . . avoid the risk . . . only by restricting their conduct to that which is
unquestionably safe." Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964) (holding loyalty oath required of
state teachers void for vagueness). Thus, the Supreme Court has applied "stricter standards of permis-
sible statutory vagueness" to laws having a potentially inhibiting impact upon speech in order to
encourage people to engage in the full scope of protected expression. Smith v. California, 361 U.S.
147, 151 (1959) (holding statute imposing absolute criminal liability on bookstore proprietors for
mere possession in store of material later determined obscene void for vagueness). See p. 157 infra
(discussing chilling effect).
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There are two main reasons to employ techniques of facial adjudication
in furtherance of the four LMRDA policies. First is the need for carefully
tailored constitutional provisions specifically related to union goals; sec-
ond, the need to avoid the fact-intensive processes of case-by-case
adjudication.
1. Forcing Carefully Tailored Provisions
Facial adjudication forces a union to draft clear and narrow constitu-
tional provisions. Whereas an as-applied approach annuls only particular
disciplinary actions, leaving the union free to apply its original prohibi-
tions in the future, facial adjudication requires the union to produce ac-
ceptable replacements for the offending provisions. This latter strategy ad-
vances union democracy, individual rights, and the union's ability in
certain circumstances to regulate its members' expression.
The LMRDA policy of promoting union democracy envisions that
union members will maintain control over their own union, formulating
the principles by which it is to be governed.63 A court that does not use
section 101(b) to void constitutional provisions inconsistent with section
101(a)(2) fails to further the goal of union democracy because it interferes
with the relationship between a union's decisionmaking bodies and en-
forcement arms. By not demanding that the union redraft its own consti-
tutional provisions, the court leaves to itself the task of "rewriting" union
rules through glosses placed on them during case-by-case adjudication.64
Voiding the provisions outright, on the other hand, would allow union
governing organs to reach their own policy decisions about discipline and
to articulate their choices coherently," as long as such determinations re-
spect any guidelines enunciated by the court. 66 This forced clarification of
63. See note 42 supra.
64. Similar problems arise in constitutional law when a court attempts to construe statutes that
are inconsistent with superior law, either federal or constitutional. Cf Note, The First Amendment
Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. REV. 844, 892-93 (1970) (judicial excision of statute's over-
breadth sometimes improper because courts not competent to make essentially legislative judgment
and because judicial restructuring of legislation may defeat plainly expressed legislative intent).
65. Cf A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 151-52, 179 (1962) (making same point
with respect to state statutes and legislatures). The clarification that ensues from the adoption of new
provisions is especially desirable where the voided provisions were vague or overbroad.
66. For example, if a court voids a provision prohibiting union members' working for any cause
"contrary or detrimental to" the union's interests, the union decisionmakers may determine that the
primary evil they had in mind was dual unionism, and they may now replace the old provision with a
new one specifically providing for expulsion of members advocating dual unionism. Pursuant to a
consent order, the IBEW recently amended its prohibition of "[wiorking in the interest of any organi-
zation or cause which is detrimental to, or opposed to, the I.B.E.W." The provision now reads:
"Working for, or on behalf of, any employer, employer-supported organization or other union, or the
representatives of any of the foregoing, whose position is adverse or detrimental to the I.B.E.W."
Boswell v. IBEW, 106 L.R.R.MAN. (BNA) 2713 (D.N.J. 1981). Cf. Sawyers v. Grand Lodge, IAM,
279 F. Supp. 747 (E.D. Mo. 1967) (member permissibly expelled because advocacy of dual unionism
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union policies increases the union membership's control over the delegated
powers and routine operations of the union by returning to the elected
governing bodies the responsibility of policymaking and denying to local
tribunals unlimited discretion over important and sensitive issues.6
The LMRDA policy of furthering individual rights also demands that
courts require union constitutional provisions to be drawn clearly and
narrowly within the perimeters of section 101(a)(2). Vague and overbroad
provisions can chill the ability and willingness of union members to en-
gage in protected expression.68 The less carefully drawn the provision, the
more cautious union members will be about airing their views;69 this chill
is especially serious in light of the importance of unfettered expression to
the scheme of the LMRDA.70 The chilling effect does not depend on the
provision's ever in fact being applied. Mere threat of enforcement often
serves as a deterrent to protected expression.'
Finally, the LMRDA's recognition of a union's need to maintain some
not protected by LMRDA). But cf Airline Maintenance Lodge 702 v. Loudermilk, 444 F.2d 719
(5th Cir. 1971) (member may be expelled, but not fined, for dual unionism).
67. For a discussion of this thesis in the context of state and federal law, see A. BICKEL, supra
note 65, at 151-52, 160-61. Professor Bickel regards vague legislation as a delegation problem: be-
cause a vague law allows for discretionary, ad-hoc decisionmaking and enforcement, the statute cir-
cumvents the control of the legislature over the other branches of government. Voiding for vagueness
merely restores to the representative branch supervision over policies and power.
68. See, e.g., Semancik v. UMW Dist. 5, 466 F.2d 144, 153-54 (3d Cir. 1972) (because of "vague
and ill-defined" provision, "reasonable man might well refrain from taking full advantage of his
rights"); Turner v. Air Transp. Lodge 1894, 83 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 10,530, at 18,116 (E.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 590 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 919 (1979) (overbroad provision discourages
members from joining associations and espousing controversial positions). Congress specifically was
aware of the dangers of vague and overbroad provisions. See 105 CONG. REC. 6477-78 (1959) (re-
marks of Sen. McClellan) (discussing typical provisions).
69. Similar concerns support the use of the chilling-effect rationale in First Amendment cases.
See, e.g., Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964) (vague and overbroad loyalty oaths cause
oathtakers to restrict conduct "to that which is unquestionably safe. Free speech may not be so
inhibited.")
70. See p. 151 supra; Maxwell v. UAW, Local 1306, 489 F. Supp. 745, 751 (C.D. Ill. 1980)
(§ 101(a)(2) meant to insure "free flow of ideas, however unpopular or outspoken, so that the indi-
vidual union members could make free and independent choices"); Peacock v. Wurf, 475 F. Supp. 65,
66 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (§ 101(a)(2) insures "proper and honest management of union affairs").
71. Constitutional law cases have discussed this issue expressly. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (Virginia anti-solicitation law overbroad because "threat of sanctions may deter
. . . almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions"). But cf Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1
(1972) (no justiciable controversy when plaintiffs complain of purely subjective chill).
The policy of promoting the individual rights of union members also is linked inextricably with the
policy of promoting union democracy. See pp. 151-52 supra. Presumably, it is for these reasons that §
101(a)(2) has been held to prohibit disciplining a member for libel, see p. 146 supra: self-government
requires the existence of effective criticism, which will be chilled unless a member knows that he
cannot be disciplined for discussing union affairs, see p. 151 supra.
First-Amendment cases also note this instrumental view of free speech. See Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (First Amendment designed to promote free expression so that "more capable
citizenry and more perfect polity" will result). Thus, the Supreme Court has shaped libel law to
promote free discussion of government officials and policies. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 269-82 (1964) (libel laws must leave room for "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate
on public issues to insure responsibility of government to people).
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control over the speech of its members requires that union provisions be
formulated rigorously and aimed at specific kinds of behavior. The nar-
row construction generally accorded by the courts to the proviso in section
101(a)(2) has made it quite difficult for a union to show that certain types
of conduct actually do pose a threat to its existence as an institution or to
its performance of its legal or contractual obligations." If a union defines
with precision the kinds of unprotected conduct against which it seeks to
shield itself, however, the courts probably will be more likely to uphold
the union's determinations. 73
2. Avoiding Fact-Intensive Adjudication
A court reviewing a disciplinary proceeding might consider how the
prohibition has been applied to the facts of the situation at hand and de-
termine only whether the particular application was impermissible, thus
employing a mode of as-applied, or fact-intensive, adjudication.7" Alterna-
tively, the court may scrutinize the face of the provision and overturn the
penalty upon finding the interdiction itself to be framed improperly. 5
This latter strategy, de-emphasizing the fact-intensiveness accompanying
as-applied adjudication, better comports with the LMRDA goals of pro-
moting both personal freedoms of union members and union autonomy
than does the former adjudicative approach.
Courts should shun fact-intensive adjudication and scrutinize the face of
constitutional provisions in order to protect the personal freedoms ex-
tended to union members by the LMRDA. Reliance on as-applied meth-
ods denies union members the full benefit of the LMRDA because it fails
to dispel the deterrent effect on protected expression caused by broad and
ill-defined provisions as well as by those directly violating section
101(a)(2). First, the as-applied approach is retroactive in effect and of
little precedential value. The judgment merely declares it illegal for the
72. See, e.g., Salzhandler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445, 450 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 946
(1963) (although inclusion in proviso of only two exceptions does not mean others were intentionally
excluded, legislative history shows Congress intended only exceptions expressed); Stark v. Twin City
Carpenters Dist. Council, 219 F. Supp. 528, 530-38 (D. Minn. 1963) (discussing evolution and nar-
row meaning of proviso); c J. BELLACE & A. BERKOWITZ, THE LANDRUJM-GRIFFIN ACT: TWENTY
YEARS OF FEDERAL PROTECTION OF UNION MEMBERS' RIGHTS 37-38 (1979) (courts follow Salzhan-
dler's narrow reading of proviso).
73. See p. 165 infra (discussing prohibitions with and without "core" and noting that latter are
more likely to be voided).
74. See Farowitz v. Associated Musicians, Local 802, 330 F.2d 999, 1002 (2d Cir. 1964) ("[allI
we decide is that a member having such good reasons as here" to believe collection of taxes illegal has
right to tell membership and urge withholding of payments).
75. See note 18 supra (citing cases). For examples of constitutional law cases employing tech-
niques of facial adjudication, see, e.g., Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974) (holding
ordinance prohibiting wanton use of "obscene or opprobrious language" overbroad in violation of
First and Fourteenth Amendments); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (holding anti-solicita-
tion law overbroad and in violation of association and expression rights).
Vol. 91: 144, 1981
Union Constitutions and Free Speech
union to have disciplined a particular member for a particular type of
expression; the resulting fact-specific decision is narrow in scope, and its
relevance to future cases depends on the facts of those cases.76 The deci-
sion, therefore, benefits the union member only inasmuch as it constitutes
a justification of his past conduct and conceivably might be of little use to
him in the future.
Moreover, because the holding concerns only the individual plaintiff,
other union members might gain little from his victory.77 Thus, the failure
to void the provision on its face increases the financial cost of expression to
the membership as a whole, for many more section 101 (a)(2) lawsuits will
be needed to achieve the result that a facial adjudication could accomplish
in the course of a single proceeding.
Second, an as-applied decision nullifies disciplinary action taken against
a member only after exacting the heavy emotional and financial sacrifices
involved in bringing a lawsuit against the union; the member unable or
unwilling to make such expenditures cannot reap the benefits of the law. 8
Although a suit to void constitutional provisions also requires similar com-
mitments, the resulting judgment is more likely to be of lasting benefit to
the plaintiff and his colleagues than would be the as-applied decision,
with its limited prospective use. Avoidance of the fact-intensive approach,
therefore, enables a plaintiff to obtain greater value from similar expendi-
tures. Moreover, facial adjudication allows for cost-spreading and class
actions, thus maximizing the decision's effect and minimizing its per-per-
son cost. 9
76. Facial adjudication is not so limited; indeed, critics often attack it for its failure to focus on the
record of a particular case. See Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 383 (1964) (Clark, J., dissenting)
(facial adjudication conjures up "ridiculous questions" and builds up "whimsical and farcical straw
man which is not only grim but Grimm"); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 571 (1948) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting) (facial scrutiny decides "abstract, academic questions"); Note, supra note 64, at 847-52
(discussing objections to facial adjudication).
77. See Curott, Electrical Brotherhood's constitution challenged in New Jersey Federal court,
UNION DEMOCRACY REV., May 1980, at 1, 2 (unlike voiding of provisions, personal victories based on
facts of litigants' particular situations are of little help to other members).
78. See id. at 2 (LMRDA requires "victimized unionist" to get own attorney and file private
suit); cf. Harold, Individual Rights Under Landrum-Griffin in Theory and Procedure, 15 N.Y.U.
CONF. LAB. 1 (1962) (individual member cannot function alone because lawsuits are expensive).
The vindication of free-speech rights imposes upon union members a burden heavier than that
imposed upon citizens by governmental legislation, whose resolution invariably ends up in the courts.
When a citizen is prosecuted for violating a law, he "automatically" receives the benefits and protec-
tions of the judicial process. Unions, on the other hand, can discipline their members without regard
to LMRDA protections unless the members take the initiative and affirmatively challenge the discipli-
nary actions in court. It is especially important, therefore, to use the leverage of the few cases that do
get to court to effect changes in union practices.
79. See Nix v. Fulton Lodge No. 2, IAMAW, 71 Lab. Cas. (CCH) % 13,859, at 27,714 (N.D.
Ga. 1972), afld sub nom. Nix v. Grand Lodge, IAMAW, 479 F.2d 382 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1024 (1973) (allowing class action in suit to invalidate and enjoin use of constitutional provision,
with class limited to members "against whom [the provision] is being invoked"). The availability of
class actions for facial adjudication allows members of the class to spread the costs of litigation among
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 91: 144, 1981
Third, facial adjudication promotes the rights of union members by en-
abling a court to create a "buffer zone" of added protection at the periph-
eries of LMRDA freedoms 0 and to extend the shelter of that buffer zone
to other members of the union not currently before the court." Whereas
fact-intensive adjudication focuses only on a particular incident and its
attendant circumstances, the facial approach would require the court to
scrutinize the scope of the challenged constitutional provisions themselves
and minimize the importance of their application under a single set of
conditions. The court could then draw a bright, prohibitory line beyond
the theoretical limit of speech safeguarded by the LMRDA and thus pro-
vide the extra "breathing space" needed to encourage all union members
to engage in the full gamut of protected expression.
Fourth, facial adjudication protects the personal freedoms of union
members by facilitating judicial review of a union tribunal's administra-
tion of vague or overbroad constitutional provisions.83 Sweeping prohibi-
themselves by sharing an attorney. Thus, union members in a situation analogous to that of the
plaintiff in Nix need not sue separately to invalidate provisions under which they were disciplined.
Fact-intensive adjudication, however, probably would not be as amenable to class-action proceedings:
whereas the class members all are similarly situated with respect to the existence and language of the
challenged provision, the members' actions and the circumstances of their discipline are likely to raise
differing questions of law or fact. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (specifying class-action requirements, in-
cluding common question of law or fact and typical claims or defenses of representatives).
Facial adjudication also facilitates speedy resolution of lawsuits by means of summary judgment. If
a court scrutinizes constitutional provisions on their face, it need not get overly involved in factual
details.
80. See Note, supra note 60, at 75, 80. The constitutional law buffer-zone idea supposes that a
prohibition, especially if vague or overbroad, will deter the exercise of protected expression because a
person whose speech is at the fringes of statutory legality will "play it safe" and not speak at all,
rather than risk being wrong about the legality or illegality of his proposed expression. Because soci-
ety presumably has decided that there is more social cost to an erroneous limitation of speech than to
an erroneous overextension of protection, see Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unrav-
eling the "Chilling Effect", 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 687-88 (1978), courts have required that statutory
lines be drawn outside the "unclear line of absolute constitutional prohibition itself" because a statute
aiming exactly at that unclear line does not leave sufficient "tolerance" to encourage expression ap-
proaching the line, see Note, supra note 60, at 80.
Similar concerns have motivated some LMRDA courts. See note 68 supra. Although LMRDA
courts have not enunciated the buffer-zone theory as explicitly as have their First Amendment coun-
terparts, its applicability would follow logically from the considerations expressed in Semancik v.
UMW Dist. 5, 466 F.2d 144 (3d Cir. 1972).
81. For a constitutional-law case discussing this extension, see NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
432 (1963) (in appraising statute's inhibitory effect upon First Amendment rights, court takes into
account possible applications of statute in factual contexts other than that at bar). This broadened
scope helps compensate for the fact that, the more effective the chilling, the less likely it is that one of
those third parties will appear in court to challenge the statute in his own right. See A. BICKEL, supra
note 65, at 149-50. Thus, some commentators have argued that any litigant should be allowed to
attack a statute for vagueness or overbreadth, both for his own benefit and for that of non-litigants.
See Bernard, supra note 61, at 276-81, 284-86. Standing doctrines may have different implications
with respect to vague and overbroad statutes. See L. TRIBE, supra note 45, at 719-22 (overbreadth
analysis is exception to rule against litigating rights of third parties, but vagueness is not).
82. See note 68 supra (without breathing space, union members might refrain from taking full
advantage of LMRDA rights).
83. Cf Note, supra note 60, at 80-85 (discussing same proposition in context of federal review of
Union Constitutions and Free Speech
tions of any sort permit the concealment of prejudicial, discriminatory,
and overreaching exercises of authority beneath findings of fact impossible
for a reviewing court to redetermine:84 the more open the interdictions'
contours, the more difficult it becomes for the reviewing court to evaluate
exactly which considerations influenced the formulation of the decision.
While a fact-intensive approach has no effect on the language of the
prohibitions, facial adjudication would force the union to draft clear and
narrow provisions whose carefully tailored offenses would make improper
applications by union tribunals more apparent to the reviewing court.8 5
Finally, facial adjudication helps to alleviate the denial of due process
inflicted by the existence of vague or overbroad prohibitions 6 that fail to
convey intelligible warnings and standards to either potential violators87 or
enforcers. 8 Though as-applied decisions eventually vindicate retroactively
the claims of members who have been disciplined impermissibly, facial
state courts and legislation).
84. Id. at 80. See Pearl v. Tarantola, 361 F. Supp. 288, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (relying on
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), and overturning guilty verdict against member charged
with precipitating work stoppage, staging sit-in, and publishing libelous article, because libel charge
may have been basis of verdict).
85. Cf. A. BICKEL, supra note 65, at 151 (vague law allows ad-hoc decisionmaking, which "short-
circuits the lines of responsibility that make the political process meaningful"). Thus, just as the
constitutional law vagueness doctrine may be considered a "practical instrument mediating between
• . . the organs of public coercion of a state and . . . the institution of federal protection of the
individual's private interests," Note, supra note 60, at 81, the same doctrine in the LMRDA context
is an instrument mediating between a union's coercive organs and the institution of § 101(a)(2)'s
protection of union members' individuals rights.
86. Constitutional law notions of due process have been held applicable in an LMRDA context.
See Semancik v. UMW Dist. 5, 466 F.2d 144, 157 (3d Cir. 1972) (requiring fair notice and reason-
ably ascertainable standards as part of requirement of full and fair hearing in accordance with due
process under § 101(a)(5)); c. Falcone v. Dantinne, 420 F.2d 1157, 1165 (3d Cir. 1969) ("What
constitutes a full and fair hearing in a union disciplinary proceeding must be determined from the
traditional concepts of due process of law . . .")
87. See Semancik v. UMW Dist. 5, 466 F.2d 144, 157 (3d Cir. 1972) (prosecutions on basis of
vague and uncertain provisions repugnant to traditional concepts of due process). But see Atleson, A
Union Member's Right of Free Speech and Assembly: Institutional Interests and Individual Rights,
51 MINN. L. REV. 403, 473 (1967) (vague and overbroad provisions may deter protected speech, but
responsibility clause in § 101(a)(2) proviso likely to be interpreted to cover only cases in which mem-
bers should have known conduct endangered union stability). Although many union members may not
be familiar with the provisions of their union's constitution and thus, in a strict sense, are not deprived
of fair notice, most union activists do have copies of the constitution and know its contents. Interview
with Amy Gladstein, supra note 21. This latter group should be the subject of particular concern.
88. See Summers, supra note 23, at 512-13 (because many clauses are subject to abuse, accused
member is apt to be convicted for conduct trial body believes undesirable rather than for conduct
constitution makes punishable). Because nonjudicial tribunals administer provisions of union constitu-
tions, it is especially critical that these prohibitions delineate precise guidelines. Members of the Local
Union's Executive Board typically comprise the Trial Boards imposing discipline on members. See,
e.g., constitutions A, D, F, H, and I. These tribunal members are intimately involved in union politics
and may even be the indirect targets of the criticisms or misbehavior at issue. See Summers, supra
note 27, at 453-57 (discussing political nature of trial committees and concluding that "union tribu-
nals are at best 'People's Courts', and are too often little more than regularized 'lynch law' "); c.
Salzhandler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445, 450 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 946 (1963) (Trial Board
composed of union officials, to whom "delicate problems of truth or falsehood, privilege, and 'fair
comment' were not familiar").
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scrutiny of provisions would obviate the need for some corrective lawsuits
by excising illegal provisions before they can be misapplied. Such excision
benefits not only the individual litigant but other members of the union as
well.
Courts also should avoid fact-intensive adjudication as part of their
commitment to promoting union autonomy. The more attention the courts
pay to the facts of particular cases, the more they end up meddling in the
day-to-day affairs of unions."' Facial adjudication, on the other hand, es-
pecially when employing vagueness and overbreadth analysis, is an avoid-
ance technique," allowing a court to recognize the pressure for individual
justice and to produce a result favorable to a litigant while still avoiding
adjudication of issues the court prefers not to decide.91 This procedure
permits the court to acknowledge principles of institutional competence
and to refuse to involve itself in the details of a particular disciplinary
proceeding, but it does not require that the litigant bear the burden of the
court's apparent irresolution."
A court relying on as-applied adjudication in an LMRDA case can
overturn improper discipline by second-guessing the union's construction
of the provision used to discipline the member 3 or by redetermining the
union's finding that the member's conduct impermissibly jeopardized the
union's security or ability to perform its obligations. 94 Either result inter-
89. Of course, a court cannot avoid considering the facts and circumstances of the case when the
union is operating under a valid disciplinary provision and bases its defense on the proviso to §
101(a)(2).
90. Cf T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 365 (1970) (discussing avoidance
in constitutional law context).
91. Cf A. BICKEL, supra note 65, at 172-73 (discussing procedure in constitutional law context).
92. Id.
93. Federal courts should defer to a union's construction of its own regulations because they lack
the "time, resources, experience, and expertness" to make a full inquiry into the speech or conduct of
a union member. Note, Free Speech, Fair Trials, and Factionalism in Union Discipline, 73 YALE
L.J. 472, 482 (1964). Other commentators go even further. See Wyle, Internal Union Operations and
the Courts, 17 N.Y.U. CONF. LAB. 399, 399 (1964) (unwise to entrust enforcement of Titles I-V to
judges "demonstrably unequipped to place in proper focus the day-to-day functioning of the modem
trade union"). Although a judge conceivably might be no more capable of recognizing properly
worded constitutional provisions than of determining "reasonable rules," id. at 407, it would seem
more likely that he would feel more comfortable if called upon to use constitutional law analogues in a
proceeding involving facial adjudication than if required to plunge into the details of internal affairs of
unions.
Moreover, courts are expected to accept unions' constructions of their constitutions. See English v.
Cunningham, 282 F.2d 848, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (courts will accept correctness of interpretation
"fairly placed on union rules" by authorized officials); Dept. of Labor, Interpretations of constitution
and bylaws, 29 C.F.R. § 452.3 (1980) ("The interpretation consistently placed on a union's constitu-
tion by the responsible union official or governing body will be accepted unless the interpretation is
clearly unreasonable."); cf. Recent Developments, supra note 16, at 1598 (union should be given
opportunity to conform challenged provision to commands of LMRDA). In keeping with this limit-
ing-construction doctrine, the holding in Semancik v. UMW Dist. 5, 466 F.2d 144, 152 (3d Cir.
1972), stressed the defendant union's use of a vague and broad provision "without making an attempt
to limit the section to avoid conflict with the LMRDA."
94. A federal court is supposed to accept a union tribunal's findings of fact. See Phillips v. Team-
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feres with the union's ability to regulate its own affairs. By voiding the
provision, on the other hand, the court can annul the instant disciplinary
action and yet leave untouched the findings of the union tribunal.95
III. A Framework for Facial Adjudication
The policies behind the LMRDA indicate the need for federal courts to
engage in facial adjudication of disciplinary provisions of union constitu-
tions. Once a court has decided to adopt this adjudicative strategy, it
should look for practical guidance to specific areas of First Amendment
law96 and to specific factors weighed in First Amendment cases, while still
sters, Local 560, 209 F. Supp. 768, 772 (D.N.J. 1962) (decisions of union tribunals in disciplinary
proceedings binding upon reviewing court with respect to findings of fact). The courts, however, have
not always held themselves bound by union tribunals' findings. See Summers, The Law of Union
Discipline: What the Courts Do in Fact, 70 YALE L.J. 175, 185 (1960) (despite disclaimers, courts do
reweigh evidence and substitute own evaluation of facts for tribunal's). Such review of union findings
occurs whenever a court overrules a union's determination that the actions of a member either violated
his responsibility to the union as an institution or impaired the union's ability to perform its legal or
contractual obligations, thus being punishable under § 101(a)(2)'s proviso. See, e.g., Kelsey v. Phila-
delphia Local 8, Int'l Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 294 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Pa. 1968),
ald, 419 F.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1064 (1970) (member's "threat" to fight
officer not within § 101(a)(2) proviso); Archibald v. Local 57, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 276 F.
Supp. 326 (D.R.I. 1967) (member's attacks on business manager's graft, corruption, and nonunion
softball team not within proviso).
95. This proposal would also serve union-autonomy values by making it possible for a union to
protect sensitive information. For example, if a member is disciplined for conduct tangentially related
to ongoing collective bargaining, the union may defend itself by claiming the protection of §
101(a)(2)'s proviso. A fact-intensive trial would require the union to prove that the member's conduct
damaged, or could have damaged, the union's bargaining position and might compel the union to
divulge information it wishes to keep from management. Facial adjudication would facilitate trials
based on less exhaustive records.
96. Courts should focus on the doctrines developed for federal-court review both of state statutes
alleged to impinge upon protected speech and of decisions of nonjudicial tribunals wielding censorship
powers. Federal cases involving review of state statutes are appropriate because of similarities between
the relationship of unions and states to federal courts. A reviewing court should respect union auton-
omy and not construe union constitutional provisions, note 93 supra, or reinterpret findings of fact,
note 94 supra. Similarly, principles of federalism require that a federal court respect state autonomy.
See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971) (enunciating principles of "'Our Federalism,'"
requiring that "States and their institutions [be] left free to perform their separate functions in their
separate ways"). A federal court does not possess jurisdictional competence to construe state statutes,
see United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971) (Court will make every
effort to construe federal statutes but has no jurisdiction authoritatively to construe state legislation),
or to review findings of fact made under valid laws, see Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229,
235-36 (1963) (state-court decision usually binding on Supreme Court where resulting from "even-
handed application" of carefully drawn statute).
Cases involving nonjudicial tribunals may provide further guidance. Courts have often applied
vagueness and overbreadth doctrines to regulations menacing protected expression through the delega-
tion of censorship powers to such bodies, see, e.g., Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 69-70
(1963) (invalidating statute placing effective censorship power in hands of Rhode Island Commission
to Encourage Morality in Youth); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948) (voiding overbroad
permit requirements granting too much discretion to licensors), fearing that the absence of judicial
supervision and "safeguards of the criminal process" increases the likelihood of abusive applications of
sanctions. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 69-70 (1963). See Note, supra note 60, at 94
(censorship power more tolerable if given to courts than if given to administrative agencies). Unions
are quintessential nonjudicial tribunals. They have the power to interpret their own constitutional
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keeping in mind the distinctive features of the labor-union context.97
A court evaluating the facial validity of a provision of a union constitu-
tion must determine initially whether the provision violates section
101(a)(2) of the LMRDA, either by penalizing protected speech98 or by
stating its prohibition in terms so vague or overbroad as to cause an im-
permissible chilling effect upon such expression.9 The first case is the
easier one: a provision explicitly contravening section 101(a)(2) should be
voided under section 101(b).
The vague or overbroad provision presents a more difficult question. A
court reviewing union constitutional provisions for vagueness or over-
breadth should consider four major criteria borrowed from First Amend-
ment law. First, the court should examine the text of the provision to
weigh the probability that the individual freedom at issue will be vio-
lated."' If the provision poses little threat of the prohibited application, it
should be upheld.10 1 In a closely related inquiry, the court should evaluate
the substantiality of the provision's vagueness or overbreadth. Any vague
or overbroad rule exerts a deterrent effect on speech or conduct; only those
rules whose vagueness or overbreadth is "real and substantial," however,
should be voided.10 2
provisions, make findings of fact, and convict and censure; all of these processes are insulated from
judicial supervision unless a disciplined member later decides to sue. Moreover, tribunal members lack
the training and, perhaps, even the impartiality of a true judiciary. See note 88 supra (discussing
union tribunals).
97. The adjudicative strategy proposed in this Note contrasts with the approach taken in most §
101(a)(2) cases. The courts that do not void constitutional provisions rarely refer to First-Amendment
precedents. Instead, those courts consider the particular conduct for which the plaintiff has been disci-
plined and determine whether it falls within the proviso to § 101(a)(2), see, e.g., Farowitz v. Associ-
ated Musicians, Local 802, 330 F.2d 999, 1002 (2d Cir. 1964) (holding contention that plaintiff acted
with design to undermine union's "very existence" unsupported by facts); alternatively, they base their
decisions on statutory language and LMRDA precedents, see, e.g., Sheridan v. Liquor Salesmen's
Union, Local 2, 303 F. Supp. 999, 1003-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (holding that cases stemming from
Sazhandler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 946 (1963), prohibit disciplin-
ing plaintiffs for statements concerning union affairs).
98. See p. 148 supra (citing example).
99. See pp. 148-49 supra (citing examples).
100. See Note, supra note 60, at 94-95.
101. Cf Note, supra note 64, at 918 (distinguishing "censorial," "inhibitory," and "remedial"
laws and concluding that first group is most susceptible to overbreadth analysis).
102. Cf Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 60 (1976) (vagueness must be
"'both real and substantial' "); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973) (same with respect
to overbreadth); L. TRIBE, supra note 45, at 712-14 (discussing substantiality requirement). Of
course, measuring the substantiality of overlap is difficult. See Note, Overbreadth Review and the
Burger Court, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 532, 537-47 (1974) (discussing Broadrick and criticizing insuffi-
cient concern for chilling effect).
Independent policy reasons support the importing of the substantiality criterion to the union con-
text. As Professor Summers notes, it is impossible for a union engaging in a wide variety of activities
to list every type of conduct that it might have cause to discipline; hence, it resorts to "catchall
clauses." Summers, supra note 23, at 505. The union must be accorded some degree of latitude, and,
if its provisions are not substantially vague or overbroad, it would seem both necessary and appropri-
ate to allow them to stand.
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Constitutional law has evolved a distinction between prohibitions that
have a "core" of clear meaning and those that have no core and are vague
or overbroad in all applications.' Courts always have shown less toler-
ance for statutes without a core, perhaps in recognition of the greater
probability that such laws will be abused. "' Similar concerns should moti-
vate a court reviewing a union constitution. Thus, a provision penalizing
the creation of dissatisfaction or dissension °10 should be considered a "no-
core" provision because it creates no definable standard by which to deter-
mine what constitutes violation and thus is susceptible to a great amount
of abuse. On the other hand, a provision censuring the disruption of, and
use of abusive language in, union meetings"°' arguably has a core: al-
though it is easy to imagine misapplications, a set of fairly articulable
behavior falls within the ban, and the provision probably will not be used
to deter and discipline a significant amount of protected expression.
Second, as a complement to the textual inquiries undertaken in the
probability and substantiality tests, a court should consider the subjective
reaction of union members in order to weigh the potential chilling effect
caused by the provision."' The court should consider, for example, the
prior use of the challenged or similar provisions.10 Chilling effect may be
a more realistic problem in a union context than in society at large be-
cause, in a smaller group, the chilling-effect rationale becomes less specu-
lative. A member who has known someone disciplined under the provision
or has heard about past applications is more likely to be affected by the
mere existence of such a provision than would someone in a larger, more
impersonal polity."' The court also should consider more generally the
103. See Note, supra note 61, at 635-36 (discussing distinction between "core" and "no-core"
statutes). Compare Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 577-78 (1974) (statute punishing treating flag
"contemptuously" has no core and is void for vagueness) with Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,
608 (1973) (upholding state Hatch Act in part because appellants concededly within "'hard core'" of
proscriptions).
104. See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575, 578 (1974) (statute without core lets enforcers
"pursue their personal predilections" as to what constitutes prohibited conduct).
105. See note 26 supra (citing provision).
106. Variants are found in constitutions C, D, H, and J.
107. See Note, supra note 60, at 75-80, 94-95; c. Schauer, supra note 80, at 698 (chilling effect
depends in part on "risk aversion" of individual). Because of such risk aversion, there is a need for
"9an insulating buffer zone of added protection at the peripheries" of protected speech. See Note, supra
note 60, at 75; c. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-73 (1964) (some speech with
no social utility must be protected to encourage expression that has such utility).
108. Cf p. 148 supra (discussing pattern-of-abuse test now applied by some courts). The criterion
proposed here differs from that now used by some courts because it is not exclusive and does not
require that courts uphold provisions absent a pattern of abuse.
109. Because unions are composed of local unions, members have ample opportunity for this in-
terpersonal contact. Indeed, union democracy may depend on the existence of smaller groups within
larger organizations. See S. LIPSET, M. TROW & J. COLEMAN, UNION DEMOCRACY 13-16 (1956)
(union democracy strengthened when members are loyal to subgroups within organization). The Lip-
set-Trow-Coleman study of the International Typographical Union (ITU), which had a vast network
of voluntary organizations created by the members and unconnected with the ITU, discovered that
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recent history of the particular union whose constitution is under review:
if the union has a history of dissent and turmoil, the court reasonably
might conclude that this atmosphere more likely will deter expression by
risk-averse members than would a more peaceful historical setting." ° Fur-
thermore, the court should consider the type of chilling at issue. The chill
caused by a prohibition against disrupting, or using abusive language in,
union meetings"' deserves less concern than does the chill effected by a
penalty for "abusing fellow members or officers":" even if it could be
shown that both provisions cause identical amounts of chilling, the deter-
rence caused by the former might be more acceptable than that caused by
the latter.113
Third, a court should consider the practical power of the federal courts
to supervise the provision's administration. The more the vagueness and
overbreadth of a prohibition obstruct judicial review and conceal arbitrari-
ness in enforcement, the more the court should suspect the challenged pro-
vision.'" 4 Union constitutional provisions in this respect deserve even more
rigorous scrutiny than do state statutes because, while the latter are en-
forced by state courts, the unions' provisions are entrusted to nonjudicial
tribunals." 5 Thus, a provision such as that prohibiting actions "contrary
or detrimental to" the interests of the union"6 is particularly problematic
because the tribunal has plenary power to determine the import of the
censured behavior, and its findings of fact supposedly are unreviewable by
a federal court." 7 Because the court lacks the power to oversee the illegal
applications of the prohibition, it becomes particularly important to void
the provision on its face.
Finally, a court should recognize when achieving greater precision in
members active in social and occupational affairs also were more politically active than were those less
involved in such pursuits. Id. at 69-72. Thus, politically active members, who are more likely than
their less-involved colleagues to run afoul of disciplinary provisions, are the very persons most likely
to be aware of the prior or threatened application of those provisions.
110. Some courts seem to have subsumed this inquiry into their consideration of patterns of abuse.
See Semancik v. UMW Dist. 5, 466 F.2d 144, 147-49 (3d Cir. 1972) (noting bringing of second set of
charges after first preliminary injunction, and of third set after second preliminary injunction).
111. See note 106 supra (citing provision).
112. Constitution H. Pursuant to a consent order, the IBEW amended its prohibition of
"[sIlandering or otherwise wronging a member . . . by any wilful act or acts." The provision now
bars "[w]ronging a member. . . by any act or acts (other than the expression of views or opinions)
causing him physical or economic harm." Boswell v. IBEW, 106 L.R.R.MAN. (BNA) 2713 (D.N.J.
1981).
113. Cf LMRDA, § 101(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (1976) (union may establish "reasonable
rules pertaining to the conduct of meetings").
114. Cf Note, supra note 60, at 80-81, 92-93, 104, 115 (making same point in First Amendment
context).
115. See note 96 supra (discussing need for more careful supervision of nonjudicial tribunals).
116. See note 30 supra (citing provision).
117. See note 94 supra; df. Lew, Landrum-Griffln Protecions Against Union Discipline, 13
N.Y.L.F. 16, 46 (1967) (courts not supposed to review evidence to check conclusions).
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drafting is impossible.118 If the framers of a provision cannot reasonably
be expected to write it more clearly and narrowly, the reviewing court
should feel more inclined to uphold the prohibition, despite its vagueness
and overbreadth. 119
The provisions examined in this Note do not reflect the careful drafting
that courts should demand. For example, courts should require that provi-
sions against "divulging to any unauthorized person the business of any
subordinate body without its consent" 120 attempt to articulate types of per-
sons who fall within the ban or general categories of information that may
not be disclosed.' The prohibition against working in the interest of any
organization or cause that is "contrary or detrimental to" the union 22
should, at the very least, be required to contain a scienter clause.1 23 As
long as such emendations are linguistically and politically feasible, courts
should scrutinize the face of the constitutional provisions with great
skepticism.
118. See Note, supra note 102, at 546; Note, supra note 60, at 95-96.
119. See United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548,
578-79 (1973) (courts recognize limitations in language to being both specific and manageably brief
and will not void statutes that ordinary person exercising ordinary common sense can sufficiently
understand and obey); L. TRIBE, supra note 45, at 718-19 (court will void only if practical to draft
statute more precisely).
There is, of course, a fundamental tension between the impossibility criterion, which defers to the
practical necessities of the drafting process, and the buffer-zone theory, which requires that govern-
ment sacrifice marginal regulatory interests when the statute advances valid but not compelling inter-
ests and inhibits protected expression. Id. at 723; Note, supra note 60, at 75-85. According to Profes-
sor Tribe, the Court "'balances' against government wherever the latter's interest seems dubious or
marginal, but reserves the possibility of balancing for government whenever its interest is clearly
compelling." L. TRIBE, supra note 45, at 723.
A similar accommodation should be attempted in the labor-union context. If a union has a legiti-
mate and compelling interest in having a certain provision in its constitution and there exists no less
restrictive way to frame it, the provision should stand; if the union's interest is not compelling, the
provision should fall, even if it otherwise meets the impossibility criterion. The burden of proving a
lack of less restrictive alternatives should rest on the union, c. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 98
(1940) (accused does not bear burden of proving that statute could have been written differently), as
should the burden of showing that its purposes are compelling, c NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patter-
son, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958) (government must prove substantiality of interest in imposing regula-
tion that deters freedom of association).
120. Constitutions B and E.
121. Pursuant to a consent order, the IBEW amended its prohibition against "[m]aking known
the business of a [local union] to persons not entitled to such knowledge." The provision now applies
to "any employer, employer-supported organization or other union, or to the representatives of any of
the foregoing." Boswell v. IBEW, 106 L.R.R.MAN. (BNA) 2713 (D.N.J. 1981).
122. See note 30 supra (citing provision).
123. Cf Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54, 59 (1967) (Maryland loyalty oath void for vagueness
and overbreadth, in part because scienter not required to convict alleged violator).
